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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to apply definitions and graphical devices currently used in the economic literature on 
poverty to individual data on tax evasion. Starting from simple indices, the paper presents composite indices and 
profiles of tax evasion and compliance, based on the three I’s of tax evasion: incidence, intensity and inequality. 
In the field of tax evasion, a stream of literature produces potentially a large amount of individual micro data 
using agent-based models: the aim of the paper is to enrich the analysis offered by these models with indices that 
take into account the whole distribution of taxpayers‟ evasion rates, rather than the usual average rate. 
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1 Introduction 
Figures about tax evasion are usually represented by very simple indices, namely the 
percentage of tax evaders, the share of unreported income, and the share of unpaid taxes. 
However, it is possible to borrow from the economic literature about poverty some definitions 
and graphical devices that can explain in a clear way some other features of tax evasion. 
Since Sen (1976), the literature about poverty measurement derived many axioms, measures 
and graphical devices that can be widely used in analyses entailing distributional issues. An 
important stream of literature focused on poverty indices expressed in terms of normalized 
poverty gaps. In particular, it is worth recalling the Three I‟s of Poverty (TIP) curve defined 
by the components of Sen index: incidence, intensity and inequality. Following this approach, 
Shorrocks (1995) and Jenkins and Lambert (1997) have defined a curve considering these 
three I‟s, called the poverty gap profile or TIP curve. More recently, Zengh (2000), Xu and 
Osberg (2001) and Xu (2003) derived from the poverty gap profile a synthesis of the poverty 
indices proposed by Sen (1976), Thon (1979) and Shorrocks (1995): i.e. the so called Sen-
Shorrocks-Thon poverty index. 
In the field of tax evasion, if individual data are available, for instance from simulation 
models, it is straightforward to see some analogies with the measurement of poverty. In the 
same way as the i-th individual of a distribution is defined “poor” by comparing income yi 
with a poverty line z (if zyi  ), an individual is regarded as  “tax evader” if declaring a 
taxable income xi lower than the true income im . The “poverty gap” is defined as the 
difference ii yzg  ; the “unreported income” can be seen as another type of “gap”: 
iii xmu  . 
The analysis of tax evasion is anyway more complex, as for poverty the reference level is 
unique for all individuals, namely the poverty line z, while in the case of tax evasion the 
unreported income is computed by using the true income im  that differs among individuals. 
Therefore, while poverty gaps and incomes of the poor are ordered exactly in the opposite 
way (i.e. if qyyyy ...321  , then qgggg  ...321 ), in the case of tax evasion it is not 
possible to link the ranking of unreported incomes with the ranking of true incomes, as the tax 
evader can be either a poor or a rich person. 
In the field of tax evasion individual micro data are rarely available. However, there is a 
stream of literature that produces potentially a large amount of individual data generated by  
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agent-based models
1
. The aim of the paper is to enrich the results of these models by applying 
to tax evasion some definitions and graphical devices currently used in the economic 
literature on poverty.  
Section 2 presents some simple indices of tax evasion and tax compliance. Borrowing the TIP 
curve concept, in Section 3 and 4 a tax evasion profile and a tax compliance profile are 
derived. Section 5 and 6 are devoted to building composite indices of tax evasion and tax 
compliance similar to the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon poverty index. An empirical exercise is 
presented in Section 7, based on individual data produced by a simple agent-based model of 
tax evasion. 
2 Definitions and simple indices of tax evasion and compliance 
There are many possible definitions of tax evasion and tax compliance, as we can consider the 
number of tax evaders, the amount of reported/unreported incomes and the amount of 
paid/unpaid taxes. 
Consider a society with N individuals i=1, …, N, with a distribution of true incomes 
 Nmmmm ,...,, 21 , a distribution of reported incomes  Nxxxx ,...,, 21  and an associated 
distribution of unreported incomes  Nuuuu ,...,, 21 . For each individual i let‟s assume 
0im , ii mx 0 , so the unreported income is: 
[1] iii xmu   
and ii mu 0 . The individual rate of evasion, i.e. the share of true income not declared, is: 
[2] 
i
i
i
m
u
e   
that is, by definition, 10  ie . The compliance rate can be defined as: 
[3] 
i
i
ii
m
x
ed 1  
The binary variable i  can be used to identify tax evaders: 
[4] 

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


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eif
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  
                                                 
1
 The use of agent-based model can be traced back to Mittone and Patelli (2000). More recent contributions are 
to Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010), Davis et al. (2003) Korobow et al. (2007) Bloomquist (2006) Bloomquist 
(2011) Zaklan et al. (2009), Pickhardt and Seibold (2011). 
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in which the value “1” is associated to a “tax evader” and “0” is associated to a “full 
complier”. The number of tax evaders, EN , and the number of full compliers, DN , are then: 
[5] 


N
i
iEN
1
           and          ED NNN   
With these elements we can define: 
- the total amount of incomes (M) and the amount of tax evaders‟ incomes (ME): 
[6] 


N
i
imM
1
          and          


EN
i
i
N
i
iiE mmM
11
  
- the amount of incomes declared by all individuals (X) and by tax evaders (XE): 
[7] 


N
i
ixX
1
          and          


EN
i
i
N
i
iiE xxX
11
  
- the amount of unreported income: 
[8]   EE
N
i
ii
N
i
i XMXMxmuU  
 11
 
With the above definitions, it is possible to compute some simple indices of tax evasion, as 
shown in Table 1. The first two indices can be related to a concept of incidence:  
 the incidence of evaders, H, i.e. the share of tax evaders in the population (the head 
count ratio of tax evaders); 
 the incidence of evaders’ reported incomes, XH , i.e. the share of income reported by 
tax evaders on the total amount of true income. 
The other two indices in Table 1 are average rates of evasion and can be associated to a 
concept of intensity: 
 the intensity of tax evasion, e , i.e. the average rate of evasion of all individuals; 
 the intensity of tax evasion of evaders, Ee , defined as the average rate of evasion 
among tax evaders. 
In the same way, Table 2 shows five simple tax compliance indices, which can be derived as 
the complement to 1 of  the corresponding tax evasion indices. 
The indices of tax evasion and compliance are computed by using the individual true income 
shares, Mmf i
m
i / , and the cumulative true income shares,  


i
j
m
j
i
j
j
m
i fMmF
11
/ . 
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Table 1 – Incidence and intensity of tax evasion indices 
incidence of evaders 
 (head count ratio of tax evaders): 



N
j
i
E
N
N
H
1
  
incidence of evaders’ true income 
(share of true income of tax evaders) 


EE N
i
m
i
N
i
iE
M f
M
m
M
M
H
11
 
intensity of tax evasion 
(average rate of evasion) 


EE N
j
m
jj
N
i
i
i
i fe
M
m
m
u
M
U
e
11
 
intensity of tax evasion of evaders 
(average rate of evasion of tax evaders) 
M
N
i
m
ii
MEE
E
H
e
fe
HM
M
M
U
M
U
e
E
 
1
1
 
 
Table 2 – Incidence and intensity of tax compliance indices 
incidence of compliers 
(head count ratio of full compliers): 
H
N
N
H Dd  1  
incidence of compliers’ true income 
(share of true incomes of full compliers) M
N
i
iid
M H
M
m
H 



1
)1(
1

 
intensity of tax compliance 
(average rate of compliance) 
efd
M
X
d
N
i
m
ii  

1
1
 
intensity of tax compliance of evaders 
(average rate of compliance of tax evaders) E
N
i
m
ii
ME
E
E efd
HM
X
d
E
 

1
1
1
 
 
 
3 Tax evasion profiles 
As done in poverty analyses
2
, if individual o grouped data are available it is possible to draw a 
curve, the tax evasion profile, that summarizes the three „I‟s of tax evasion: incidence, 
intensity and inequality. 
The profile represents the cumulative values of a “tax evasion variable”  Ni yyyy ,...,,...,1  
(on the vertical axis) as a function of the cumulative share of a “reference variable” 
 Ni wwww ,...,,...,  (on the horizontal axis). The profile has the typical concave shape (as it 
is actually a rotated Lorenz curve) if individuals are arranged in decreasing order according to 
a variable  Ni zzzz ,...,,...,1  that represents a vector of individual measures of tax evasion: 
iii wyz / . 
                                                 
2
 Jenkins-Lambert (1997), Xu-Osberg (2001). 
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In general, the profile of a tax evasion variable y can be defined by the following notation: 
 


i
j
j
w
i yzFyL
1
)~,(    with    Ni ,...,1  
in which: 
 


i
j
w
j
i
j
j
w
i fwF
11
 is the cumulative distribution of the reference variable w, 
 z~  means that individuals are arranged in decreasing order of z ( Ni zzz  ......1 ). 
In the case of poverty there are two possibilities, as the poverty profile can be defined by 
using either absolute poverty gaps or poverty gaps normalized with the poverty line. When 
dealing with tax evasion, more choices can be made: 
 about the reference variable on the horizontal axis: 
- cumulative population share 
- cumulative true income share 
- cumulative taxes due 
 about the tax evasion variable on the vertical axis: 
- cumulative unreported income share 
- cumulative unpaid taxes shares 
 about the values of shares of the tax evasion variable: 
- absolute values 
- normalized values 
Combining the 3 types of choices we can build up 12 profiles. To simplify the analysis I just 
focus on the normalized unreported incomes profile, based on the following choices: 
 cumulative share of true income (in the horizontal axis); 
 cumulative share of unreported income (in the vertical axis), normalized with the total 
amount of true incomes; 
 individuals arranged in decreasing order according to the individual rates of evasion. 
In Figure 1 the horizontal axis represents the cumulative share of true incomes: 
[9] 


i
j
m
j
i
j
jm
i f
M
m
F
11
 
For the i-th individual, the normalized unreported income is: 
[10] mii
i
i
ii fe
M
m
m
u
M
u
  
that is the individual rate of evasion ie  weighted with the true income share 
m
if . The variable 
in the vertical axis is the normalized unreported incomes profile: 
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[11] mj
i
j j
i
j
jm
i fe
M
u
eF
M
u
L   





11
~,  
that is a function of miF  for the data set ),...,,( 21 Nuuuu   normalized with the total amount of 
true income M, where e~  refers to the sequence of ie ‟s arranged in decreasing order. 
For all evaders, i.e. for all ENi ,...,1  which have 0ie , the cumulative share of true income 
(the abscissa of point A in Figure 1) is equal to the incidence of evaders’ true income: 
[12] M
E
N
j
j
H
M
M
M
mE

1
 
and the maximum value of the profile is equal to the intensity of tax evasion, i.e. the  average 
rate of evasion for all individuals (the ordinate of point A in Figure 1): 
[13] efeeHM
M
u
L
EN
j
m
jjM 






1
)~,/  
The curve starts from (0,0) and increases as subsequent tax evaders are added. Each segment 
represents a tax evader. For individual i, the slope of the segment is equal to her rate of 
evasion: 
[14] ii
j
m
j
i
j
m
j
i
j
m
jj
i
j
m
jj
m
i
m
i
m
i
m
i
e
ff
fefe
FF
eFMuLeFMuL














1
11
1
11
1
1 )
~,/()~,/(
 
So segments have decreasing slopes as subsequent tax evaders have decreasing rate of 
evasion. When ie  becomes zero, subsequent individuals are full compliers and therefore no 
unreported income is added, therefore the curve becomes horizontal at the right of point A. At 
that point we can see the indices of tax evasion: on the horizontal axis the dotted line shows 
the incidence of evaders‟ true income ( MH ), while on the vertical axis the dotted line shows 
the intensity of tax evasion ( e ). 
The inequality among rates of evasion is highlighted by the concavity of the arc BA

0 . 
The slope of the line from the origin to the point A is the ratio: 
 slope E
M
EM
M
e
H
eH
H
e
OA   
that is the average rate of tax evasion of evaders. The slope of the line OB is equal to the 
intensity of tax evasion, e . 
As an example, consider the micro data of Table 3. There are 10 people with true income 
ranging from 10 to 100. Four of them are tax evaders and their rate of evasion varies from 
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30% to 75%. With these figures, the incidence of tax evaders is 50%, the incidence of 
evaders‟ true income is 45% and the intensity of tax evasion is 27% (see Table 4). Figure 1 
shows the normalized unreported income profile.  
 
Table 3 – Example of individual data on tax evasion 
Individuals 
True 
income 
Declared 
income 
Unreported 
income 
Rate of 
tax 
evasion 
Tax 
evaders 
(=1) 
Cumulative 
true income 
share 
Cumulative 
normalized 
unreported 
income share 
 
i im  ix  iu  
i
i
i
m
u
e   
i  
m
iF  )
~,/( eFMuL mi  
1 80 0 80 1.00 1 0.133 0.133 
2 60 24 36 0.60 1 0.233 0.193 
3 20 10 10 0.50 1 0.267 0.210 
4 50 32 18 0.36 1 0.350 0.240 
5 60 42 18 0.30 1 0.450 0.270 
6 90 90 0 0 0 0.600 0.270 
7 100 100 0 0 0 0.767 0.270 
8 70 70 0 0 0 0.883 0.270 
9 40 40 0 0 0 0.950 0.270 
10 30 30 0 0 0 1.000 0.270 
Total 600 438 162  5   
Note: People ranked according to non-increasing rate of evasion 
 
Table 4 – Indices of tax evasion and tax compliance 
%50
10
5

N
N
H E  %501  HH d  
%45
600
270

M
M
H EM  %551  M
d
M HH  
%27
600
162

M
U
e  %731  ed  
%60
270
162

E
E
M
U
e  %401  EE ed  
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Figure 1 – A tax evasion profile 
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4 Tax compliance profiles 
A profile similar to the one introduced in the previous section can be derived by considering 
the tax compliance rate. The profile represents the cumulative values of declared income 
 Ni xxxx ,...,,...,1  normalized with the total amount of true income (on the vertical axis) as a 
function of the cumulative share of the true income  Ni mmmm ,...,,...,1  (on the horizontal 
axis). Individuals are arranged in increasing order according to their tax compliance rate: 
iii mxd / . 
The profile is defined by: 
[15] 







i
j
m
jj
i
j
jm
i fd
M
x
dFM
M
x
L
11
,/    with    Ni ,...,1  
in which the set of reported incomes, x, is arranged in increasing order of d 
( Ni ddd  ......1 ). 
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By construction, the slope of the profile is the individual measure of tax compliance: 
[16] i
i
i
m
i
m
i
m
i
m
i
d
m
x
FF
dFMxLdFMxL





1
1 ),/(),/(
 
As shown in Figure 2, the curve starts from the origin and increases as subsequent individuals 
are added. Each segment is associated with an individual and its slope represents the 
individual tax compliance rate id , so individuals with higher slopes comply more. If some 
individuals are full compliers the profile has a slope equal to 1 at the right of some point A, 
because 1id  (i.e. 0ie ) for all subsequent individuals. Therefore all evaders are plotted on 
the left of point A (with 1...1  ENdd ) and all full compliers are plotted on the right (with 
1...1  NN dd E ). The abscissa of point A shows the incidence measure of tax evasion MH , 
while the ordinate shows the share of reported incomes of evaders on the overall true income: 
[17] ME
N
j
m
jj
N
j
j
M Hdfd
M
x
dH
M
x
L
EE







 11
,  
The slope of the straight line connecting the origin with point A is the average value of 
compliance among tax evaders: Ed . The profile ends at point B, where all individuals are 
added to the profile. The ordinate of point B is: 
[18] d
M
X
fd
M
x
dFMxL
N
j
m
jj
N
j
jm
N  
 11
),/(  
The slope of the straight line connecting the origin with point B is the average value of 
compliance among all individuals: 


N
i
m
ii fdd
1
, that is an intensity measure of tax 
compliance. The inequality of individual measure of tax compliance is shown by the 
concavity of the profile.  
If all individuals are tax evaders and have the same value of the compliance rate 
( 0...1  ddd N ) the profile is the dotted line connecting the origin with point B.  
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Figure 2 – A tax compliance profile 
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As an example, consider again the micro data presented in Table 2: the intensity of tax 
compliance is 73% ( 600/438/  MXd ). If all the positive values of the tax compliance 
rate are equal, then the profile is the straight line connecting the origin with point A, and its  
slope is equal to the average rate of compliance of tax evaders: 
%40270/108/  EEE MXd . 
 
5 A composite index of tax evasion 
A composite index of tax evasion can be derived from the unreported income profile simply 
by normalizing the area below the curve with the maximum value of the area.  
The maximum area below a tax evasion profile is reached when “all evade all taxes”, i.e. 
when the incidence of evaders‟ income is 1MH  and the intensity of unreported income is 
1e  (see fig. 1). In this case the tax evasion profile is a straight line from (0,0) to (1,1) and 
the area below the curve is equal to 0.5 (i.e. 2/112/ eHM ). 
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The tax evasion profile defined in Section 3 is an inverted Lorenz curve that represents the 
cumulative share of normalized unreported income: 
[19]  




 i
j
jm
i
M
u
eF
M
u
L
1
~,  
where individuals are arranged in non-increasing order with respect to their rate of evasion ie , 
i.e. if Ni eeee  ......21 . 
The area below the profile in Figure 1 can be computed with the geometric method: with N 
individuals, the area is a sum of N trapezoids. For the i-th trapezoid the parallel bases are the 
values of the ordinates, i.e. )~,/( eFMuL mi  and )
~,/( 1 eFMuL
m
i , while the height is 
m
i
m
i
m
i FFf 1 . For ease of notation we define )
~,/()( eFMuLFL mi
m
iu  , so the area below 
the profile is: 
       mNmNumNummumummu fFLFLfFLFLfFLa 1121211 )()(
2
1
...)()(
2
1
0)(
2
1
  
By rearranging and substituting  
i
j j
m
iu MuFL 1 /)( : 
[20]  mimi
N
i i
fFu
M
a    )1(22
1
1
 
To obtain the composite index of tax evasion we normalize the area a with respect to the 
maximum value of the area when “all evade all taxes”, (equal to 0.5): 
[21]  mimi
N
i i
fFu
M
E    )1(2
1
1
 
From Fig. 1 it is also possible to compute the Gini inequality index of rates of evasion. As the 
maximum value of the profile is e  instead of 1, the Gini index can be defined as: 
[22]  mimi
N
i im
fFu
Mee
a
eF
M
u
G 





  )1(2
1
121~,,
1
 
Substituting in [21], the composite index of tax evasion becomes: 
[23]   eFMuGeE m ~,,/1  
It is also known that the Gini index changes the sign when elements are arranged in the 
opposite order, so that    eFMuGeFMuG mm ,,/
~,,/  , therefore the composite index of tax 
evasion can be written as: 
[24]   eFMuGeE m ,,/1  
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As EM eHe  , this composite index is a simple transposition of the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon 
poverty index (Shorrocks, 1995, Xu-Osberg, 2001) to tax evasion: 
[25]   eFMuGeHE mEM ,,/1  
So, the index E incorporates the three I’s of tax evasion: 
 the incidence of evaders‟ true income: MH , 
 the intensity of tax evasion among evaders: Ee , 
 the index of inequality of rates of evasion:  eFMuG m ,,/ . 
 
6 A composite indices of tax compliance 
Similarly, a composite index of tax compliance can be derived from the reported incomes 
profile by normalizing the area below the curve with the maximum value of the area. 
In this case, the maximum area below a tax compliance profile (see Figure 2) is reached when 
“all pay all taxes”, i.e. when the incidence of compliers‟ income is 1dMH  and the intensity 
of reported income is 1d , so that the tax compliance profile is a straight line from (0,0) to 
(1,1) and the area below the curve is equal to 0.5. In Figure 2 the profile can be seen as a 
Lorenz curve  
i
j
jm
i
M
x
dFMxL
1
),/( , which represents the cumulative share of normalized 
reported income when individuals are arranged in increasing order with respect to their rate of 
compliance id , i.e. if Ni dddd  ......21 . 
Following the same procedure of the previous Section the composite index of tax compliance 
can be written as: 
[26]  mimi
N
i i
fFx
M
D    )1(2
1
1
 
As before, it is also possible to compute the Gini inequality index of rates of compliance, 
taking into account that the maximum value of the profile is d  instead of 1: 
[27]    mimi
N
i im
fFx
Mdd
a
dFMxG    )1(2
1
121,,/
1
 
Substituting in [27], the tax compliance index is: 
[28]   dFMxGdD m ,,/1  
Again, the composite index of tax compliance is very similar to the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon 
poverty index, as it depends on the average rate of compliance d  (an intensity measure) and 
on the Gini index of normalized reported incomes. 
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Looking at the Gini indexes, it can be shown that: 
[29]    eFMuG
e
e
dFMxG mm ,,/
1
,,/

  
i.e. the Gini index of unreported incomes is connected to the Gini index of reported incomes 
by means of the average rate of evasion e . It is worthwhile noticing that substituting 
 dFMxG m ,,/  in [29] we obtain: 
[30]    EeFMuGeD m  1,,/11  
so the compliance index is the complement to 1 of the tax evasion index. 
 
7 An example with ABM simulations 
In order to provide an example of tax evasion profiles and indices in comparing different 
situations, we generate some distributions of rates of evasion by using a simple agent-based 
model. 
Following the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki
3
 framework where tax payers maximize 
their expected utility we define the individual utility as: 
[31] ii i
k
iiii yeeyU


1
)1(),(  
where: 
 iy  is net income; 
 ie  is the tax evasion rate, defined as the share of income not reported ( 10  ie ); 
 ik  is an individual parameter representing the attitude to comply; 
 i  is the individual risk aversion parameter. 
The income tax is applied at a constant rate t to the exogenous amount of income Ii, which is 
not known to the Government. Hence, the amount of taxes paid by individual i is 
iii IetT )1(  . The Government controls taxpayers with probability p: if an individual is 
audited, the tax evasion is certainly discovered and the tax payer has to pay a fine of f times 
the amount of evaded tax: iii IfteF  . 
If the taxpayer is not controlled, the net income is  
[32]  )1(1)( iiiii etITIeW   
If, instead, the taxpayer is audited, the net income is: 
                                                 
3
 Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974). See Pyle (1991) and Sandmo (2005) for a review of the 
subsequent literature. 
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[33]  )1(1)( iii fetIeZ   
Given the tax rate, the probability of control and the fine, each taxpayer chooses the share of 
income to unreport, ei, in order to maximize the expected utility: 
[34]   ),()1(,)( iiiiiii eWUpeZpUeEU   
Two tax evasion profiles are simulated. Simulation A is characterized by lower tax rate, 
probability of control and fine but higher attitude to comply with respect to simulation B (see 
Table 5). Using the terminology of Kirchler et al. (2008), the society described by simulation 
A has more “trust” and less “power” than that described by simulation B. The resulting indices 
and profiles are shown in Figure 3, while Figure 4 shows the tax compliance profiles.  
With respect to simulation B, in simulation A the composite index of tax evasion E (23.2% 
versus 30.5%), incidence and intensity indices are lower, while the inequality among the rates 
of evasion is higher (the Gini index is 81.5% versus 47.1%). From Figures 3 and 4 we can see 
that the profiles intersect, so it would be possible to study the conditions for tax evasion 
dominance (see Jenkins and Lambert, 1997). 
Table 5 – Parameters and results of the simulated tax evasion profiles 
Parameters 
income distribution iy   2,30000ln N  
risk aversion distribution i  )0.1,0.0(U  
  Simulation A Simulation B 
attitude to comply distribution ik  )4.0,0.0(U  )2.0,0.0(U  
tax rate t 20% 30% 
probability of control p 2% 5% 
fine f 200% 500% 
Results 
Incidence of evaders H 33.0% 70.0% 
Incidence of evaders‟ true income MH  27.3 71.4% 
Intensity of tax evasion e  12.8 20.7% 
Intensity of tax evasion of evaders Ee  46.8% 29,0% 
Gini index of rates of evasion  eFMuG m ,,/  81.5% 47,1% 
Composite index of tax evasion E 23.2% 30.5% 
Composite index of tax compliance D 76.8% 69.5% 
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Figure 3 – Simulated tax evasion profiles 
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Figure 4 – Simulated tax compliance profiles 
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8 Conclusions 
In this paper we adapted some concepts, indices and graphical representation that were 
originally developed for poverty analysis to the analysis of tax evasion. The composite index 
of tax evasion and the tax evasion profile can have a practical use for analyzing individual 
level data produced by agent-based models of tax evasion, increasingly used in the literature.  
The tax evasion profile can also be used if aggregate data about tax evasion are available for 
some taxpayers‟ characteristics. For instance, if we knew that in a given country the self-
employed earned the 30% of gross income with a tax evasion rate of 50%, while the 
employees earned the remaining 70% with a tax evasion rate of 5%, then we could easily 
draw the tax evasion profile and compute the average tax evasion rate (18.5%), the Gini index 
of inequality (11.35%) and composite index of tax evasion (20.6%). 
Future research could address the adapation to tax evasion of other theorethical results 
borrowed by poverty analysis, such as conditions for tax evasion dominance and ethical 
issues. 
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